POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONCEPTS OF "MASSIVE RETALIATION"
As far back as during the reign of the Truman Administration, the Republicans called for the creation of a new military strategy derived from the assumptions of the doctrine of a total war. They blamed their predecessors for the lack of ideas to fight against communism and carrying too passive policy consisting in accepting the postwar order instead of striving to regain influences and territories occupied by the Soviets 1 .
The first coherent concept in foreign policy presented by the then new authority was the doctrine of "liberation". Its author, James Burnham, presented three variants of conducting policy towards the Soviet Union. The first of them was the containment policy, which was a rational move only in the period immediately after World War II, when the United States was not strong enough to impose their conditions. The second one was the policy of "concessions", and the third -the policy of "liberation" 2 . For obvious reasons, the new administration had to reject the first idea and choose between the two others.
The doctrine of "liberation" adopted by Eisenhower implied freeing nations from both the Soviet Union and communism. The liberation of lands acquired by the Soviet Union before and after the World War II was also an important postulate to "push" 3 communism away to the borders of the USSR and eliminate it in its homeland. The intention was to accomplish the task with all available forces and means, including the withdrawal of approval for governments of the new socialist countries, the formation of military units for the countries of Eastern Europe, and preparations for a possible armed conflict, and even a total war, in which the strategic Air Force of the United States and its allies were to play the main role 4 .
The program New Look developed in 1953 was the military variant of "liberation". The program was the effect of the work of three independent expert teams whose task was to find the correlation between the interests of the United States and threats. Finally, four different concepts were submitted for the considerations, the first of which was based on the continuity of the doctrine of "containment" led by the former president. Another proposal was to follow the strategy of "deterrence", setting a precise line around the Eastern Bloc, crossing which was associated with the use of weapons of mass destruction by the United States. The third option was the release of areas from the Soviet occupation under the policy of "liberation". The last concept, rejected indeed by Eisenhower, was a preventive war aiming to destroy the nuclear potential of the Soviet Union and to prevent a situation in which the Soviet nuclear capabilities are 1 The containment strategy was criticized for the lack of clearly defined objectives and prospects as well as the fact that it was mostly a patchwork of ideas, concepts and assumptions, See: J. Lider October, in turn, the Paris Agreements were signed, providing for the end to the occupation of FRG, granting it the right to form its own armed forces and the accession of West Germany into NATO and the Western European Union 10 .
In May 1957 the North Atlantic Council approved the first coherent concept of the strategy of "massive retaliation", encoded as MC 14/2. The basis for the development of the General Strategic Concept of the North Atlantic Area was the American New Look. The fact somewhat explains the emphasis in the new strategy on recognizing the ability of the Alliance to destroy the USSR completely and the announcement of a massive nuclear attack in the event of an enemy assault on any of the Member States. In addition, the document divides the NATO armed forces into "shield" and "sword" forces.
The armies of Western countries were to serve as the shield, while the role of the sword was played by the US strategic nuclear forces. At the time of the invasion on Western Europe the task of the latter was to carry out massive retaliatory strikes on targets in the Warsaw Pact countries. The US strategic Air Force were to deal with drops of nuclear bombs, the allied forces of the USA and NATO were responsible for marine operations, while conducting operations in Europe was to fall to land and air forces of the countries of the Old Continent 11 .
NATO strategists had to be reckoned with the appearance of new, previously unknown problems, not only military but also political, economic or psychological ones, associated with the use of weapons of mass destruction. It was expected that a future war would have a nuclear character causing the greatest destruction in its first phase. As envisaged, it was to be distinguished by extreme violence and the massive use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, thus hindering mobilization and movement of troops, as well as communications and logistical support. For this reason, the duty of the Allies was to develop the capacity to absorb and survive a nuclear attack from an enemy 12 .
In the eyes of the West the strategy of massive retaliation was an effective and inexpensive method of deterring the Soviet Union from aggression 13 The US nuclear um- 10 J. Kukułka brella extended over the European part of NATO was to balance the outnumbered armies of the Warsaw Pact, and provide a much less expensive substitute for respectively large number of conventional forces. Giving too much weight to nuclear weapons was the main reason to criticize President Eisenhower Administration. Opponents to his policy -the number of who was growing also in Europe 14 -claimed that the use of nuclear weapons as a deterrent, consistent with the "orthodox" military strategy, could lead only to the destruction of the world or to the unconditional surrender of one of the parties. After all, a nuclear war was to be the reaction to even a slightest provocation from an enemy in every corner of the globe 15 . However, the concept of massive retaliation was unexpectedly fast nearing to an end.
Less than three months after the adoption of the new strategy by NATO the Soviet Union once again proved that nuclear superiority or the inviolability of the territory in the nuclear arms race are rather relative terms.
In August 1957, the Soviet Union informed the world about the positive results of the tests of ballistic missiles, and in October about the launch of the first artificial satellite of the Earth. This fact completely surprised the West, especially the United States, which led its foreign policy based on the assumption that the territory of the United States is safe, and the costs pursuant to a possible nuclear war would be only borne by enemies and Western European countries 16 .
NATO strategists' response to these events was the recognition that henceforth the whole Euro-Atlantic area was within the range of Soviet nuclear weapons, and that in the event of a war with weapons of mass destruction there would not be a potential winner 17 . The next step of the Alliance was to be the modernization of armaments, the increase in the number of armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany and equipping it with nuclear weapons 18 .
The increasingly aggressive rhetoric of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's statements made the situation more serious, as he announced the mass production of next rockets after subsequent satellites of the Earth had been launched into space. This state was understood in the West as the effect of neglecting the Soviet threat and the creaally. Also the belief in the excellence and superiority in the sphere of nuclear weapons of the United States over the Soviet Union played a significant role. S. Zapolski, op. cit., p. 22-23. 14 At the end of the 1950s the area of the United States was in the range of the Soviet nuclear weapons. Serious doubts began to appear among the allies whether the United States would decide to stand up for Western Europe, risking Soviet nuclear retaliation on its own territory. 15 J. L. Gaddis, Strategie powstrzymywania…, p. 230-231. tion of the "missile gap" between the potentials of both powers 19 . It turned out that in the late 1950s the Soviet Union had enough military potential to carry out a massive nuclear attack on Western Europe and the USA. This fact meant in effect that the basic assumptions of the 'massive retaliation' strategy became obsolete, and deterrence no longer played its role.
POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONCEPTS OF "FLEXIBLE RESPONSE"
At the end of Eisenhower's presidency in the 1950s the doctrine of "massive retaliation" underwent a crisis. The most important objection towards it was the lack of flexibility, as the only answer to the aggression of the Eastern Bloc countries was to be a massive nuclear attack. This concept could act as a deterrent only until the decisive nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union and "untouchability" of the US territory was maintained. However, at the end of the 1950s the awareness of the inevitability of a Soviet nuclear attack, or a nuclear retaliation, forced the United States and its allies to seek more flexible solutions.
The theories of a total war as well as a limited one were put at the forward. They varied solely in the scale of the use of nuclear weapons. Supporters of the war in a global context were divided into two groups, one of which promoted a pre-emptive strike, the second one -handling an enemy's attack, and then applying retaliatory attacks. Different concepts clashed in the first group, ranging from "massive retaliation" limited only to the territory of Europe through "a pre-emptive strike", and ending with "a preventive war". The first idea involved attacks on major economic, industrial and military facilities in the Soviet Union, but only in the event of conflict on the Old Continent. A "pre-emptive strike" was to rely on a massive nuclear strike carried out at the right time preceding an enemy's attack. While, a "preventive war" was confined to the destruction of industrial centers and the nuclear arsenal of an enemy before it would be ready for military action. The second group included sympathizers of the concept of the "second-strike" assuming a nuclear attack of the strategic Air Forces and the missile arsenal against strategic armed forces of an attacking enemy. The strategies of "limited and sustainable deterrence" were taken into consideration as well. The first of them pointed to cities as targets of a nuclear attack, while the second one both the enemy's armed forces and its cities 20 . 19 In the late 1950s and early 1960s the US advantage in the field of nuclear weapons declined, as it did in the field of missile means of delivery. The Kremlin constantly expanded its system of intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, thereby consolidating its position as the undisputed leader in conquering space. Proponents of the concept of "limited wars" 21 called for the preparation of the United States not for a global war, but for those waged in smaller areas. Therefore, it was proposed to expand the arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons used selectively against military objectives located only on the battlefield, not the back. It was felt that also modern land and navy forces would be necessary to conduct the limited warfare 22 .
The new President John F. Kennedy Administration carried out the full review of the US military strategy. Its effect was the strategy of "flexible response" proclaimed in 1961. General. M. D. Taylor 23 was the ideologist of the new doctrine. In his book "Uncertain signal" he was the first to use the term "flexible response", and he stated that the US forces should have been ready to participate in all kinds of wars, ranging from conventional, limited and partisan, to total and unconventional ones. Taylor also called for maintaining the ability to retaliate at all possible levels, from local threats to a total war. He marked, however, that the nuclear power could not be the only option in the fight against an enemy. He even believed that a total war involving nuclear weapons could be ruled out because of the mutually devastating consequences to which it would lead 24 . General also proposed the reversal of the roles of the "shield" and the "sword". Strategic nuclear forces were to assume the role of the "shield" and create the so-called nuclear umbrella, while conventional forces were to be the "sword", equipped with tactical and operational nuclear weapons so as to enhance the effectiveness of operations. 25 Washington accepted most of Taylor's postulates. In 1962 in his speech during the session of the National Security Council, President Kennedy finally clarified the three prin- 21 The American politician and strategist Henry Kissinger was the supporter and also the originator of the theory of a limited war. In his monograph of 1957 -Nuclear weapons and foreign policy he indicated two ways to adjust the US policy and military strategy to new circumstances. These included the improvement of the deterrence strategy in order to achieve the expected political benefits, and the development of a new model of wars in place of "massive retaliation". As he argued, the United States could then impose their conditions to an enemy 'from the position of strength' -using the threat of a nuclear war or its implementation, but not in the form of a total, but a limited war. 30 The Soviet attempt to create a direct nuclear threat to the United States through the deployment of nuclear installations within Cuba in 1962 led to the biggest Cold War crisis after the World War II, putting the world on the threshold of a nuclear holocaust. Contrary to assumptions of the Kremlin, the United States having detected medium-range missiles on the territory of Cuba responded very categorically, demanding their immediate removal. Despite pressure from the Pentagon on the use of nuclear weapons, Kennedy limited their activity to the blockade of the island, hence stopping the supply of rockets. The crisis was resolved only after a series of secret negotiations between Washington and the Kremlin, which was the result of the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba and the end of the sea "quarantine". See: J. This copy is for personal use only -distribution prohibited.
-pensive means to discourage the Soviet Union from an attack with prevailing conventional forces. An important argument of Washington on this issue was to increase the number of operational variants before introducing nuclear weapons as the ultimate solution. The new strategy, especially the idea of reversing the "shield" and "sword", were not welcomed in Europe with enthusiasm. According to the American allies, moving the center of gravity on conventional weapons could mean a loss of confidence in the US nuclear weapons as a fundamental element of deterrence 32 . Therefore, the revision of strategies and structures for the allied armed forces in this respect encountered a strong resistance on the part of the Allies 33 .
The control over the use of nuclear weapons by NATO became one of the most important issues in the mutual relations between the United States and its European allies 34 . Disputes arising while discussing this matter significantly delayed the implementation of NATO's new strategic arrangements. Finally, after 7 years 35 of the USA's proclamation of the strategy of "flexible response" the Alliance adopted the Overall Strategic Concept of the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area -MC 14/3.
As in previous strategies, the main assumption was to deter an enemy from aggression against members of the Alliance, using both nuclear and conventional potential. In the event of a war, three types of response were already anticipated. The first one was to be the so-called direct defense, which consisted of the repulse of an enemy's aggression by any means, including nuclear weapons, as well as preventing the enemy from the realization of its goals. The second type of response was to be slow escalation, that is repelling aggression by intensifying, or where possible, by controlling the scale and intensity of combat operations. Among others, demonstrations of nuclear force and selective attacks on chosen targets were allowed. The third and the last and at the same time the most overwhelming response was to be a massive nuclear response, taken only when the Soviet Union would launch a nuclear war. It was assumed that the targets of the attack would be military objectives and, if the situation required, the urban and industrial facilities. The document strongly emphasized the role of strategic nuclear forces, and tactical nuclear weapons remaining at the disposal of the main This copy is for personal use only -distribution prohibited.
-commanders of the NATO. Along with conventional weapons they were the effective means of deterrence and potential tools to inflict disastrous losses on an enemy. 36 In 1969 the strategic concept MC 14/3 was supplemented with Means of Implementation of the Overall Strategic Concept of the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area (MC 48/3), which set out the requirements for the execution of defense of NATO countries as well as the priority was to increase the capacity to conduct operations using conventional forces, with maintaining the possibility of nuclear escalation 37 .
The fourth strategic concept of the Alliance lasted 24 years and became the longest binding strategy of NATO. Despite numerous events in the international arena, several modifications of doctrines and strategies in the United States and frequent disagreements and divergent views on various issues within the Pact, its main assumptions remained unchanged until the end of the Cold War.
The end of the 1960s witnessed the further struggle for dominance in the world. The Vietnam War was a painful defeat for the Americans 38 . Its enormous costs, not only in financial and military terms, for many years did not allow the American society to enjoy the "fruits of peace", which the gradual reduction of worldwide military presence of the United States had brought with itself 39 . Despite the advent of the "détente era" 40 the continuing high arms rate of both powers resulted in acquiring the ad-vantage by the USA in the number of men under arms for the first time after the World War II, on the other hand the Soviet Union's gradual catching up with the US military potential. As early as in 1970 the Soviet Union had more intercontinental missiles than the United States. However, the overall advantage in nuclear weapons still remained on the side of the latter 41 .
In 1971 the modification of the US military strategy took place. Taking over the power by the Administration of President Richard Nixon resulted in the introduction of the new strategic concept called "realistic deterrence". It was the continuation of "flexible response", in which it was decided to increase the effectiveness of "deterrence". After all, the new strategy maintained the concept of flexible handling of nuclear and conventional potential 42 .
The main assumptions of the new strategy was the creation of a volunteer army, the reduction of the number of American troops, the expansion of conventional forces while maintaining the strategic role of nuclear weapons, reducing military spending and financial assistance for the modernization of the armed forces allied for the USA. The most important changes in the new strategy, however, was a departure from the principle of "two and a half wars" to "half a war", the replacement of the principle of "assured destruction" with the principle of "strategic prudence", as well as "basing on the advanced frontiers" with "strategic mobility". In other words, the theory of "realistic deterrence" assumed the maintenance of the US conventional forces capable of conducting only one major war. The possibility of military intervention simultaneously on several fronts, e.g. in Europe and Asia, or against national liberation movements in Latin America and Africa, were abandoned. While the role of naval and air forces whose task was to ensure the movement of conventional troops in any corner of the globe was increased 43 .
The strategy of "realistic deterrence" ushered in the rapid development of the strategic offensive forces of the USA and other NATO countries. Under the so-called "ocean strategy" a part of the strategic nuclear weapons were moved from land to sea. The idea was to reduce the number of targets of an enemy's nuclear strikes in the United States. At the same time, considerable attention was paid to maintain the reign on the Atlantic Ocean and the seas surrounding Europe. It was to be a necessary condition for the success of a war in the European Theatre of Operations 44 .
In 1976 the strategy of "realistic response" was expanded by the concept of "selective choice". 45 It assumed the multivariate use of strategic strike forces, however, with the emphasis on a limited nuclear war. In its course the potential nuclear strikes were to be directed only against the armed forces and military objects of an enemy, thus limiting civil losses to a minimum 46 .
The following year, after two years' discussions, the North Atlantic Alliance adopted the so-called "double-track strategy" in dealings with Eastern Bloc. The impetus for its achievement was the disturbed balance of power in the Central Theater of Military Operations triggered by the deployment of multi-head medium-range missiles by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. The answer to this move was to be the increase in the Alliance possibilities of real deterrence by strengthening continually the military potential of NATO and the deployment of the American Pershing II missiles in Western Europe, as well as parallel search of relaxation in relations with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states. The strategy of "double-track", realized anyway by the Alliance to the end of the 1980s, put the strong emphasis on the continuation of negotiations on arms control 47 .
The war in Afghanistan 48 began by the Soviet Union in 1979 ended the period of dé-tente, which lasted nearly a decade and at the same time became a stimulus for further modifications to the American foreign policy and military strategy. Jimmy Carter 45 The concept developed by James Schlesinger, the former Secretary of Defense, is also known as the "Schlesinger Doctrine". 46 Ibidem, pp. 60; S. Zapolski, op. cit., p. 54. 47 S. Zarychta, op. cit., p. 60. The maintained "balance of terror" between the USA and the USSR led in Europe to both a feeling of nuclear fatalism and willingness to counter the threat actively. It was manifested in numerous demands on the ban of nuclear weapons and disarmament proposals and counterproposals. The first agreement on limiting nuclear weapons was the treaty banning nuclear tests in three environments: in the atmosphere, outer space and under water signed in 1963. The next step was the "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon" signed on 1 July 1968, which obliged not to transfer nuclear weapons, information and devices for their production by countries possessing weapons of mass destruction to countries being not in possession of them. The SALT II and I proved to be the milestone towards limiting nuclear arms race in the form of reduction of strategic weapon systems. This copy is for personal use only -distribution prohibited.
-presented changes to its assumptions during the Presidential Proclamation in January 1980. Carter announced the desire to maintain the position of the superpower by the United States and the desire to hamper communism and fulfill the role of a defender of the West. These proposals were to be achieved through political and military alliances and the construction of military bases mainly in the Middle and Far East. New strategic objectives were set out in "Presidential Directive 59" signed half a year later.
Basically it determined the new directions in the planned use and development of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the Directive anticipated the capability to conduct a longterm though a limited nuclear war and -which did not fall already under the "flexible response" -allowed the possibility of pre-emptive, massive or selective attacks on selected targets of an enemy, while still retaining the ability to further nuclear assaults. Nuclear missiles, already characterized by much greater accuracy, were to harm both opposing forces as well as objects of strategic importance to an enemy, that is political and administrative centers for governing the state, command posts, areas of nuclear weapons deployment and communications nodes. What is particularly important, the Directive 59 did not rule out nuclear strikes on civilian targets in the form of all major cities of the Warsaw Pact countries 49 .
Although the findings of the doctrine outlined in the last year of the term of Jimmy Carter were not rejected by his successor, the electoral victory of Ronald Reagan meant a mandate to change that course and strengthen the American power. From the very beginning of holding his office the new President criticized the policy of dé-tente relating to the Soviet Union. He even argued that the deviation from détente meant reducing the risk of a nuclear war by pushing both parties to negotiate an agreement on all issues diverging them. According to the assumptions developed in 1983 in the Directive No. 75 of the National Security Policy, the Reagan Administration sought to "deter and over time fend off the Soviet expansionism through effective confrontation in all areas of international politics". Within its framework there was planned the development of the arsenal of nuclear and conventional weapons, the introduction of economic sanctions, the promotion of human rights, as well as covert support for anti-Soviet movements in Eastern Europe 50 .
Reagan did not approve the concept according to which a stabilizer of the international system would be the balance of nuclear potentials. He thought that the easiest way to overcome the "evil empire", as he called the Soviet Union, was pulling it in the grueling arms race. Its reactivation took place already in 1982, when the Pentagon developed a very costly 5-year program of armaments, including the production of neutron weapons, multi-head ballistic missiles, bombers and submarines. In turn, in March of the following year the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was put forward, in which the idea of "star wars" and the implementation of the project to build a strate- This copy is for personal use only -distribution prohibited.
-gic missile defense system were adopted. Under this project the United States intended to deploy in space and on earth the evaluative anti-missile system. The cost of its implementation was estimated at $ 25 billion 51 .
The response of the Soviet Union seeking to restore the balance of powers was the deployment of operational-tactical missiles of extended range within the territories of the GDR and Czechoslovakia, and increasing the number of submarines equipped with missiles with nuclear warheads, operating near the territorial waters of the United States 52 .
Complete change in the relations between the two powers led to the selection of Mi- 53 The proclaimed Gorbachev's reform slogans were better known under their Russian names: glasnost', perestroika and uskorienije. 54 Brezhnev Doctrine, also known as the doctrine of "limited sovereignty" of the communist camp countries, meant in fact the right of "fraternal parties" to defend socialism threatened by the forces of counter-revolution operating in collusion with "external enemies". 
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-to be a surprise on both sides of the "Iron Curtain". The nuclear arms race and the Cold War ended more quickly than any of the politicians and strategists could have imagined 56 .
NUCLEAR CONCEPTS OF "MASSIVE RETALIATION" AND "FLEXIBLE RESPONSE"
The strategy of "massive retaliation" was, to an extent, the continuation of the "containment" strategy. As in the previous period, the basic tool of deterrence was still nuclear weapon. Indeed, it became very quickly the foundation of all the military plans of the United States. Their blatant acknowledgement was the creation of powerful strategic strike forces capable of launching attacks both preventive and those of typical massive retaliation 57 .
Although the doctrine of "massive retaliation" did not rule out the possibility of waging limited wars, it treated them rather marginally, allowing their launching only in the socalled peripheral areas. Its supporters called for the need to reduce the scale of the use of nuclear weapons to its tactical version, seen by many as weapon of "small" power and, in case when used for strategic purposes, applying to selectively chosen military targets directly on the battlefield, and also on its back. Cities, industrial facilities and communications nodes were to be covered with the contractual prohibition of attacks. 58 .
Strategists thought that the common form of a conflict was to be, however, a total nuclear war, using the overall security of the United States territory and the overwhelming US advantage in the nuclear arsenal and means of delivery. Its nuclear concept focused mainly on Europe and assumed that nuclear weapons would be used to the full extend and from the very beginning of each serious conflict 59 . 56 Great systemic changes that occurred in the late 1980s and 1990s in Central Europe began to undermine the meaning and usefulness of the existing structures of the Eastern Bloc. The issue of the Warsaw Pact as a key instrument to sanction political and military hegemony of the Soviet Union was put forward. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union postponed the symbolic act sealing the collapse of its empire, the liquidation of the Bloc military structures took place on 1 April 1991, while the final termination of the Warsaw Pact three months later. The CMEA constituting the second pillar of the socialist camp collapsed together with the liquidation of the military alliance. The last and final act of dismantling the post-war world order was the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which was officially announced on 30 December 1991 in Minsk. The termination of the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA, the failure of the referendum on the preservation of the USSR as a renewed federation and the failed coup in Moscow greatly accelerated the internal break-up of the country. More: J. Kukułka, op. cit., p. 451-455. 57 The development of nuclear weapon systems, including tactical weapons, and equipping all branches of armed forces with them proved to be much cheaper than the development of costly conventional forces. In the first three years of the policy of the "New Look", the defense budget of the United States was reduced by approx. 20%, while the Air Force as the main performers of the new strategy was extended at the same time, and spending on the development of new means of delivery increased. See: R. Kupiecki This copy is for personal use only -distribution prohibited.
-Under the so-called strategy of the "sword and shield", the Americans and their allies rejected the possibility of a capitulation or planned retreat from the European territory. While its defense assumptions were based on conventional delaying measures of the Western armies, giving the necessary time to prepare and carry out massive bombing within the strategic nuclear attack of the American Air Force 60 . The Overall Strategic Concept For The Defense Of The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area MC 14/2, based on the document (NSC-162/2) of the US National Security Council, allowed the possibility of the outbreak of a total nuclear war, launched by the aggression of the Soviet Union on Western European countries. It was expected that the start of such a war would be a powerful nuclear offensive carried out in a very short time and with great intensity, aimed at the elimination by the USSR of NATO nuclear weapon delivery systems and other strategic military targets. Moreover, it was assumed that the only way to prevent the loss of the Alliance territory would be the immediate and massive use of nuclear weapons at both strategic and tactical levels. The first phase of a war, lasting no longer than a month, was expected to be characterized by the largest number of nuclear strikes 61 . While the second and last phase of the war, of the duration difficult to determine, was to be spent on reorganization, replenishment and achievement of specified military objectives enabling the end to the conflict 62 .
In connection with the probability of the drastic reduction in mobilization bases of both warring parties, and taking into account the decisive importance of operations conducted in the first phase of a war, the NATO's Military Committee prioritized the separation of the active forces capable of achieving success at the beginning of a conflict. On the one hand, they were to ensure an immediate and devastating nuclear counterattack carried out using all available forces and retain the ability to receive and survive an enemy's attack, on the other hand to deprive it of nuclear capabilities, eliminate from the fight and destroy its resources and communications systems 63 .
The adoption by NATO of the nuclear deterrent factor as the most effective means, at the same time generating the lowest costs, was considered the best way to discourage the Soviet Union from launching attacks on Western Europe with conventional forces. This resulted in the deployment on the territory of Europe of tactical nuclear weapons and medium-range ballistic missiles 64 . 60 R. Kupiecki, op. cit., p. 156. 61 The first days of a nuclear conflict were to be of decisive importance for the fate of a war. It was expected that then warring parties would earnestly try to gain an advantage, fully using their arsenals and making huge destruction. 62 
Final decision on MC 14/2 (Revised). A Report by The Military Committee on Overall Strategic Concept
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-
The era of "balance of terror" which began in the early 1960s, associated with the emergence of the so-called principle of mutual assured destruction 65 , in fact ended the period of definite nuclear retaliation in the event of the Soviet aggression and initiated much more flexible response. Under the new strategy, the United States began preparations to conduct various types of wars below the threshold of a total nuclear war. This did not mean, however, hampering of the development of a nuclear arsenal but, on the contrary, focusing on the expansion of strategic nuclear forces. According to the concept of the strategic triad, 66 there were introduced, among other things, new longrange bombers 67 , intercontinental missiles 68 and ballistic missiles launched from sub- 65 Its source was the concept of the so-called guaranteed damage developed in 1963. As a result of numerous transformations, in 1967 it finally adopted the form of the principle of "mutually assured destruction". In essence, this concept boiled down to the conviction that any attack on the part of one of the superpowers would trigger a retaliatory strike, resulting in losses of a similar or larger scale. See: R. Kupiecki, op. cit., p. 220. 66 The concept of the strategic triad assumed the creation of three independent means of delivery of nuclear weapons to ensure, regardless of the loss, carrying out effective nuclear strikes. 67 The bombers B-52 entered service in 1955 and constituted the core of the US military strategic forces during the Cold War. They replaced the aircraft Convair B-36 and the Boeing B-47 Stratojet. In 1963 already 650 strategic bombers stationed in 42 divisions at 38 airfields served in the US strategic Air Forces. See: S. Zarychta, op. cit., p. 133. 68 The first American intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) were Atlas missiles constructed in 1956 and introduced into service in 1959. They had a two-stage drive and five liquid propellant engines, providing transfer of a nuclear warhead with a capacity of 1.44 Mt and 3.75 Mt (depending on the version) on a distance of 14000 km. Atlases were launched from underground silos. Due to the low accuracy they were intended to destroy cities and industrial centers. In the early 1960s the ICBM Atlas missiles were replaced by the new generation of Minuteman I. Unlike predecessors they were driven by solid fuel and carried the W59 warheads with a capacity of 1 Mt. In 1966 "Ones" were superseded by more advanced missiles Minuteman II. Their range was extended from 10000 km to 12,500 km, accuracy increased by 200 m and new heads W-56 with a capacity of 1. This copy is for personal use only -distribution prohibited.
-marines 69 . Equipping with modern nuclear weapons for tactical and operational purposes covered all types of troops, including those stationed in Europe 70 .
In 1958, the NATO Council approved the document MC 70, containing a comprehensive plan for development of the armed forces of Member States for the next five years. It placed particular emphasis on the equipment of Western armies in means of tactical nuclear weapons delivery and the strengthening of the Bundeswehr, which was to become the strongest army in the Central European Theater of Military Operations 71 .
In the 1960s also the concept of using nuclear mines in the system of operationaltactical barrages appeared in the military plans of NATO. Although, the Member States accepted the principles of their use under the name of the Trettner Plan 72 not until 1964, preparations for their development began in 1950. Initially the construction of operational barrages strips only along the eastern border of West -East Germany was assumed. Ultimately, however, the Trettner strip reached the length of 650 km at the depth of 100 km and stretched from the Baltic Sea to Austria 73 .
According to the adopted concept, nuclear mines 74 were planned to use both for putting self-barrages, as well as the construction of barrages combined with conventional engineering means. It was expected that in this configuration it could effectively stop an enemy's actions, hinder its troops' maneuvers and push them to assembly areas, a strike at which with the use of conventional weapons and nuclear power was to be prepared in advance. Depending on the covered direction and tasks performed, mines 69 The first American medium-range submarine launched ballistic missile Polaris were introduced into service in 1960. Three different versions thereof (A1, A2, A3) were characterized by a range from 2200 to 4500 km, and the capability to deliver a warhead of 1 Mt or -as in the case of A3 -three heads of 200 kt. Poseidon was the successor of the SLBM Polaris, the world's first operational missile equipped with 14 independently guided warheads with the capacity of 50 kt. each (according to the START I limitations, the number of warheads was reduced to 10). The reduction of the power of nuclear weapons was possible due to much higher accuracy than its predecessor's, not-exceeding 450 m. In the early 1970s, 31 American nuclear-propelled submarines were equipped with This copy is for personal use only -distribution prohibited.
-were intended to be set individually at nodes, sections and strips of nuclear barrages 75 . Their placement was also affected by the terrain, a type of planned combat operations, as well as the capacity of nuclear weapons, the span of which ranged from 0.01 to 47 kt. Nuclear mines could be placed underground, under water, on the ground and inside buildings to be destroyed 76 .
According to the Polish data from the beginning of the 1980s, the number of all prepared chambers in West Germany exceeded 7,000, where 1,252 nodes with 4501 chambers 77 were recognized by intelligence. An extremely important issue was the fact that NATO treated mines as defensive measure and planned their use in both nuclear and conventional wars. According to Western strategists, the use of nuclear mines of very low power should not be considered as initiating a nuclear war, but only as the use of conventional barrages of increased power 78 .
Another nuclear conception of that period, this time aimed at limiting civilian casualties, was the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP-63), containing a list of targets attacked in the Warsaw Pact countries. These targets, in line with the assumptions of "flexible response", were limited to those of primarily military importance. They were divided according to the following hierarchy:
 targets Alpha: the destruction of the Soviet strategic forces and political and military command centers located outside the urbanized area;
 targets Bravo: the destruction of military facilities, including barracks, airfields and air defense units deployed outside the cities;
 targets Charlie: the destruction of military nuclear facilities, political and military command centers and 70% of industrial centers located in urban areas. 75 Mines set individually were intended to destroy particularly important field, military and industrial objects. While the task of nuclear barrage nodes composed of a few mines was the creation of separate areas of nuclear destruction and radioactive contamination for tactical purposes. Sections of nuclear barrages made by connected nodes were to serve to create zones of destruction and radioactive contamination of the area at operational and tactical levels. Strips of nuclear barrages set along state borders or in front of important defensive frontiers were intended to create continuous destruction and contamination zones for hundreds of kilometers along and dozens deep. According to the tactical standards in force in NATO, a continuous nuclear barrage composed of mines with the capacity of 10 kt. spaced about 350-500 m apart was projected to be constructed in the plain and open field, especially on the main direction of an enemy attack. Their distribution according to the scheme: 2-6 minutes on the area of 100 km² was designed to provide the total power of a nuclear explosion of 20-60 kt. 
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The above targets were to be attacked in accordance with five specific variants: a) Preventive strikes on targets Alpha with 3,200 bombs and missiles (including multi-head ICBMs) to destroy 1700 objects; b) Preventive strikes on targets Alpha and Bravo with 3,500 nuclear warheads to destroy 2200 objects; c) Preventive strikes on targets Alpha, Bravo and Charlie with 4200 nuclear warheads to destroy 6500 objects; d) Retaliatory strikes on targets Alpha, Bravo and Charlie with 4,000 nuclear warheads to destroy 6400 objects; e) Retaliatory strikes on targets Alpha and Bravo with 3200 nuclear warheads to destroy 2,100 objects 79 .
In practice their implementation meant firstly the elimination of an enemy's capability to carry out a nuclear attack, and only then the limitation of its arms capabilities by destroying industry and reducing the ability to deploy its troops on the territory of the Alliance.
This concept was slightly modified in 1976, after the United States had introduced the Schlesinger Doctrine and the principle of "selective choice" providing the flexible use of nuclear weapons against selected targets. 80 In line with this strategy, the strength of strikes performed and selected targets were to remain in close association with political objectives of a war conducted. It was assumed that a limited number of strikes with strategic forces would be performed under favorable conditions, manifesting in this way the willingness and ability to escalate hostilities. The significant accuracy of strikes was to allow the reduction of a number of possible targets of attack, and the conscious abandonment of planning attacks on urban centers was to reduce losses not directly related to military operations 81 . Meanwhile, treaties on the limitation of strategic arms (SALT I and SALT II) and ABM (Antiballistic Missile) systems concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1970s led to the balance of the nuclear arsenals of both superpowers 84 (Table 1 ). Under the strategy of "mutually assured destruction", the guarantor of security supported by the presumption that neither party dares to carry out a surprise attack were imperfect self-defense and high risk, almost certainty, of a retaliatory strike. However, the American deterrence capability balanced by the Soviet Union put into question the ability of the USA to implement the allied guarantees in Europe 85 .
The situation was further complicated in 1977 when the USSR started to deploy 250 multi-head high-precision medium-range missiles SS-20 86 , directly threatening Western countries 87 . In this way, the American "nuclear umbrella" spread over Western Europe proved to be insufficient. This fact soon was repeatedly used by the Soviet Union for blackmail and attempts at intimidation directed against European allies of the USA.
For the first time the Soviet Union tried to act from the position of strength in 1978, when Western European countries in order not to irritate Moscow did not agree to the offer of Washington regarding the equipment of NATO in Europe with neutron bombs 88 , which were to balance more than twice as many as the number of tanks of the Warsaw Pact 89 . However, in the same year in the sense of Soviet domination, the Allies decided to set up in Europe the early warning system against a nuclear attack (AWACS) 90 .
The attempt to counterbalance the Soviet missile system SS-20 and the new arsenal of short-range missiles was to be the deployment of 108 new generation missile launchers Pershing II 91 and 464 multi-head cruise missiles Tomahawk 92 in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Great Britain and Italy. The move was one of many elements of the new armament program adopted in the early 1980s by the President Ronald Reagan Administration. In addition to the equipment of its allies with the new offensive weapon capable of having a direct impact on the Soviet Union territory, the Pentagon also decided to restore the production of neutron weapons, start the program of building the multi-head ballistic missiles MX 93 system, producing the bombers B-1 and the new submarines, as well as initiate works on the construction of the strategic anti-missile defense, the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative 94 (SDI) 95 . This copy is for personal use only -distribution prohibited.
-deterrence factors included maintaining the capacity for retaliation of own forces against effects of a pre-emptive strike, and credibility based on the strong willingness to use appropriate force guaranteeing the win in a potential war. The combination of means of effective defense, credible retaliation and escalation of military action as the way to adapt them to the level of threat were to ensure the effectiveness of deterrence 96 .
The implementation of the Reagan plans turned out to be the great military and political challenge for the Soviet Union. The start-up of the new arms race threatened with the collapse of the excessively militarized and economically inefficient Soviet economy, and the possible creation by the Americans of weapons effectively neutralizing enemy nuclear strikes constituted a serious violation of Moscow's position as a global superpower.
The end of the 1980s, however, brought the unexpected solution: the end to the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet empire. Undoubtedly, the paradox can be seen in the fact that it occurred at the time when the Soviet Union reached the highest military potential and nuclear superiority.
CONCLUSION
The strategy of "massive retaliation" adopted in the early 1950s by the President Eisenhower Administration served as the effective and inexpensive method of deterrence not only in the assumptions. The US nuclear umbrella spread over the European part of NATO discouraged the Soviet Union from aggression, as well as it rebalanced the numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. However, the announcement of giving nuclear weapons the decisive role in any, even the smallest conflict posed a threat of the outbreak of the total nuclear war.
The extremely important moment in the creation of the system of strategic deterrence was the introduction of the hydrogen bomb to the nuclear arsenal. It determined the evolution of the nuclear strategy on both sides of the "Iron Curtain". The advent of the light thermonuclear bombs with high capacity became an impulse for the creation of ballistic missiles. Globally, the creation of this type of weapon significantly speeded up attaining the nuclear stalemate and contributed to searching for measures of a limited nuclear war and "flexible response" as an alternative to "massive retaliation".
Military conditions changing from the early 1960s quickly ruled out the use of nuclear power as the only way of conducting any military operations. The new strategy introduced first in the United States and then in NATO was based upon flexible handling of both nuclear and conventional potential. Although, the intensive expansion was set about in the case of the latter, the growing in parallel arsenal of nuclear weapons, as a much cheaper substitute for the huge land forces, retained its strategic role. Its constant development resulted in the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons, and later the implementation of costly and high technology nuclear arms programs. This copy is for personal use only -distribution prohibited.
-ar weapons, despite a few modifications to the "flexible response" strategy, rich in new concepts for the selection of targets (avoiding strikes on the cities) or a limited war, remained a symbol of assured destruction and the political-strategic element of deterrence until the end of the Cold War.
